Friday 7 November TP5 -Distribution Networks
Markets for Electricity (i) Markets for Electricity (i)
• Members of EU liberalising their electricity industries -The EU Electricity and Gas Directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC were adopted in 1996 and 1998, with member countries having until February 1999 and August 2000 to incorporate their provisions into domestic legislation.
• Electricity is a difficult commodity to deliver:
-All power stations in an AC network must be synchronised -Electricity is generated at the instant it is consumed -Some capacity must always be held in reserve able to increase output instantaneously
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Markets for Electricity (ii) Markets for Electricity (ii)
• The main objectives for a set of electricity trading arrangements should be:
-Grid remains electrically stable in operation -All power supplied is paid for -The efficient operation of the system is encouraged using the cheapest power stations available to meet demand -Agents have the choice of making most transactions at stable prices, agreed in advance
Electricity Pricing (i) Electricity Pricing (i)
• Traditional peak-loadpricing for a public utility -System is energy-limited rather than capacity-limited -The marginal cost of energy is the shadow value of water -Price will be almost constant over short time periods but rise in low rainfall and fall when water is abundant
• Mixed hydro-thermal system:
-Both types of plant may be marginal -Shadow value of water will equal the VC of the thermal stations that would increase their generation in response to a reduction in the available water supply
Pool in England and Wales (i) Pool in England and Wales (i)
• First power system in Europe to introduce market based reforms-separate generation from transmission, distribution and retailing • Fears that changes would make the system hard to control _ wholesale market had much in common with operating systems used before privatisation
• In the Pool dispatch is centrally scheduled by the SO, based on bids made by generators and the SO's estimates of demand. These are also used to determine prices, although generators and electricity suppliers can hedge Pool price fluctuations with financial contracts.
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Pool in England and Wales Pool in England and Wales (ii) (ii)
• Generators compete to supply electricity in a particular day by submitting bids for each genset by 10am the previous day. A bid consists of 5 elements: -a start-up price (which is a price in £ for simply startingup the unit), -a no-load price (£ per hour, for keeping the unit warm regardless of the amount of electricity produced) -three incremental prices for power actually generated (£ per MWh)
• A computer algorithm, SUPERGOAL, sorts the generators' bids into a "merit order" to produce an unconstrained schedule to meet the forecast demand and reserve requirements at minimum cost.
Pool in England and Wales Pool in England and Wales (iii) (iii)
• The replacement of coal fired stations by combined-cycle gas turbines tied to privatisation and the formation of the pool • The pool was more prone to price spikes • The pool never succeeded in introducing more cost-reflective charges
• By the late 1990s widely recognised that the pool was incapable of reforming itself leaving the market in a vulnerable position 
Nordic Electricity Market (ii) Nordic Electricity Market (ii)
-Bid format -Participants submit a price/quantity curve for each hour. This shows the quantities in MW that the participants is prepared to supply (a positive MW) or purchase (a negative MW) from the spot market at different prices. -Price Formation -Nordpool balances supply and demand by stacking up the supply and demand curves of the market participants. -A price in NOK is calculated for each hour of the day ahead by 1300 hours at the latest of the prior day and the exchange notifies each player of the prices and quantities of their trades. -If there any disputes to be resolved, these should be notified by 1430 -and prices and quantities recalculated if necessary.
• Financial market for weekly contracts -Contract Types -There are two types of contract that can be traded on the financial market:
• base load power covering 24 hours of each day for a full week;
• peak-load power covering 0700-2200 hours Mondays to Fridays -Duration and timing of contracts -These contracts can be trade as single weeks up to between 4 and 7 weeks in advance, as blocks of four weeks from between 5 and 8 weeks and up to 52 weeks in advance, and as seasons of several blocks 1-3 years in advance.
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Spanish Electricity Market (i) Spanish Electricity Market (i)
• "Day-ahead market" started operations in Jan. 98
• Working of the market -Before 11:00 a.m., qualified buyers and sellers of electricity present their offers for the following day. -Each day is divided into 24 periods -Sellers in the pool present offers consisting of up to 25 different prices and the corresponding energy quantities for each of the 24 periods and for each generating unit they own; the prices must be increasing. -If no restriction is included in the offer this is called a "simple offer".
Spanish Electricity Market (ii) Spanish Electricity Market (ii) -A seller may also present a "complex offer" which may include indivisibility conditions, a minimum revenue condition, production capacity variation or load gradient conditions and scheduled stop conditions. -The pool administrator combines these offers matching demand and supply for each of the 24 periods and determines the equilibrium price for each period (the system marginal price) and the amount traded. This matching is called the base daily operating schedule. -After the base daily operating schedule is settled, the pool administrator evaluates the technical feasibility of the assignment; and make the provisional hourly schedule -Purchase bids state a quantity and a price of a power block -The pool administrator constructs with these offers an aggregate demand. -Volatile balancing market prices were a design objective to encourage early contracting but generators who cannot predict output in advance (eg wind generators) make losses because of this volatility -Falling prices for power but arguments whether this is a direct result of NETA -Government and the regulator have argued that moving from uniform pricing to bilateral trading reduce the scope for market power but studies show (Newberry, 1999) this may also discourage entry making prices less competitive overall -A consequence of the substantial over-capacity of generation at the present time is that there is no incentive for further investment in traditional generation plant, and this is thus biasing future generation towards a gas based generation industry -Volatile wholesale prices are passed on to the consumer -Utilities run the risk of a Californian-type disaster
